



Department of State

TELEGRAM

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

73 AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED & RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED ☐

SECRET PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

AN: 0790458-1129

SECRET

PAGE 01 KABUL 07326 01 OF 02 060307Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----030038 061424Z /66

R 040410Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5886
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

EXDIS REVIEW

- Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and content
assigned to S/S

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7326

4/1/87

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/3/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M

TAGS: PINT AF UR

SUBJ: SOME DISTURBING SIGNS AFFECTING AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE
AND THE POSITION OF AMIN: PART ONE OF TWO

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. MUCH CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN WASHINGTON
OVER SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS ON THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE OXUS,
BUT MORE SIGNIFICANT AND OMINOUS MAY BE THE GROWING SOVIET
MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE NUMBER OF TROOPS
AND MILITARY ADVISORS -- TOTALLING PERHAPS 7,000 -- AND
THE ROLE THE LATTER ARE PLAYING, MAKES IT MOOT WHETHER THIS
OR ANY OTHER AFGHAN REGIME CAN AGAIN EXERCISE FULL INDEPENDENCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. WHILE A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN
WASHINGTON ABOUT THE POSSIBLE POSITIONING OF SOVIET AIRBORNE
TROOPS JUST NORTH OF THE OXUS, I THINK A MORE DANGEROUS
AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN THE CONTINUED
BUILD-UP OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND FORCES IN THE COUNTRY,
AND THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF SOVIET GENERALS TO DIRECT

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 KABUL 07326 01 OF 02 060307Z

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE TROUBLED PRO-

SECRET

87 DOS 00141 , LC

SECRET

VINCES OF PAKTIA, GHAZNI AND KONAR.

4. TO RECAPITULATE THE SITUATION:

(A). SOVIET TROOPS ARE NOW KNOWN TO BE STATIONED IN THE FOLLOWING TWO STRATEGIC AREAS:

-- BAGRAM AIR FORCE BASE, LOCATED ABOUT 25 MILES NORTH OF KABUL, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT AIR BASE IN THE COUNTRY. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS GUARDING THE BASE IS MODEST: ABOUT 600. MORE SIGNIFICANT IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN GIVEN CONTROL OF THE BASE. IT TOGETHER WITH KABUL AIRPORT (PARTLY AN AIRFORCE BASE AS WELL) ARE HIGHLY STRATEGIC POINTS FOR CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL AND SURROUNDING AREAS.

-- KABUL ITSELF AT PROBABLY THREE LOCATIONS: KABUL AIRPORT (AT THE AIRFORCE AREA), POL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE, AND THE MICRORAYON APARTMENT COMPLEX WHERE MANY SOVIETS LIVE. THESE TROOPS, NUMBERING PERHAPS 3,600 ARE PROBABLY HERE FOR SEVERAL PURPOSES, SUCH AS GUARDING THE SOVIET COMMUNITY IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. THE TROOPS WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO TRY TO SECURE KABUL AIRPORT AND THE PRINCIPAL TANK BASE (OVER 150 TANKS) IF NECESSARY.

(B). THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT CONTINUES TO ARRIVE IN IMPRESSIVE AMOUNTS. THE LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY TANKS AT POL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE APPEARS TO BE WELL IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBER OF AFGHAN TROOPS ABLE TO OPERATE THEM.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 01 KABUL 07326 02 OF 02 060308Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----030040 061440Z /66

R 040401Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5887
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7326

EXDIS

EXDIS REVIEW

~~Cat. A~~ Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.

4/1/87

(C). THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS SEEMS TO BE ALWAYS INCREASING AND MAY NOW NUMBER ABOUT 3,000.
(D). PERHAPS JUST AS IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT THE ROLE OF THESE MILITARY ADVISORS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ENHANCED OVER THE LAST SOME WEEKS. THIS MAY BE CONNECTED WITH THE 6-WEEK-LONG VISIT OF A CONTINGENT OF 13 SOVIET GENERALS IN COUNTRY. THE GROWING ROLE OF THE SOVIETS IS NOTICEABLE IN TWO WAYS. ONE IS THE ELEVATION OF THREE SOVIET GENERALS TO POSITIONS OF, IN EFFECT, DIRECTING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE THREE MOST TROUBLED PROVINCES: PAKTIA, GHAZNI AND KONAR. THE OTHER IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF MORE SOPHISTICATED COUNTER-INSURGENCY TACTICS IN AT LEAST THE GHAZNI AREA, POINTING TO A SOVIET HAND.

5. I THINK THE EXPANDED SOVIET ROLE IN THE COUNTRY RAISES SOME FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND POLICY QUESTIONS FOR US. ONE IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE NOT NOW IN SUCH AN INFLUENTIAL POSITION THAT THEY HAVE A CONTROLLING INFLUENCE OVER THE REGIME AND THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE. WHILE I DO NOT SUGGEST THAT THE COUNTRY HAS TOTALLY LOST ITS INDEPENDENCE, I WONDER WHETHER THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 KABUL 07326 02 OF 02 060308Z

INFLUENCE HERE ARE NOT NOW SUCH THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A SOVIET SATELLITE STATE AKIN TO MOST OF

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

THOSE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND MONGOLIA. CERTAINLY, HAFIZULLAH AMIN, OR ANY OTHER PARTY SUCCESSOR, IS VERY BEHOLDEN TO THE SOVIETS TO STAY IN POWER. THE LEVERAGE AND INFLUENCE THE SOVIETS CAN NOW EXERT IS TREMENDOUS, AND GIVEN THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE KHALQIS, NO KHALQI REGIME COULD LAST A WEEK HERE WERE THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW THEIR SUPPORT. HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS MUST KNOW THIS.

6. I ALSO SEE NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DIMINISH THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE OR THEIR SPECIAL POSITION IN THIS COUNTRY. WERE HAFIZULLAH AMIN, OR A SUCCESSOR, TO DESIRE TO EXPEL THE SOVIETS, I DOUBT THEY COULD NOW DO IT. THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKELY RESPOND BY PUTTING FORWARD SOME AMENABLE KHALQI "LEADER" WHO WOULD "REQUEST" THE CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE, AND THERE ARE PROBABLY ENOUGH IN THE PARTY WHO WOULD GO ALONG WITH A CHANGE.

7. BY SEPTTEL (PART TWO), I DISCUSS HAFIZULLAH AMIN, HIS LIKELY VISION OF THE SOVIET ROLE, AND WHERE THE U.S. MIGHT FIT IN.
AMSTUTZ

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET